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ABSTRACT 
This pap& presents the quantitative risk assessment for the storage of titanium tetrachloride 
(TiCl,). It is the major reactant used for the production of titanium in the titanium sponge 
plant. Titanium tetrachloride readily reacts with moisture, leading to the release of toxic 
hydrogen chloride (HCI). Fire explosive and toxicity index analysis, and hazard and operability 
(HAZOP) studies for the entire titanium sponge plant were carried out. Based on these studies, 
the TiCl, storage section was found to be one of the most hazardous sections in the titanium 
sponge plant. Fault tree analysis technique has been used to identify the basic events responsible 
for the top event occurrence, ie, release of HCl due to the hydrolysis of TiCl, upon contact 
with moisture in the environment during spillagelleakage of TiCl, from the storage tanks and 
to calculate its probability. Consequence analysis of the probable scenarios has been carried 
out. The risk has been estimated in terms of fatality.and injuries. Based on these results, basic 
input in the form of recommendations for possible changes in the design and operation of the 
titanium sponge plant have been made for the risk management. 
Keywords: Risk analysis, hazard assessment, consequence analysis, titanium tetrachloride, risk 
management, fault tree analysis 
NOMENCLATURE R Pool radius 
H' Upper height up to which the atmospheric water Mrem, Amount of free water in concrete 
enters into the pool 
M,w Total mass of water that liquid encounters in 
"a Volumetric flow rate of air each time step 
Z Reference height of wind speed I Depth of penetration of concrete from the pool 
zo Roughness length of the substrate 
U(z) Wind speed at a height z 
fw Kilogram of water /kilogram of total air 
6t  Time step 
Mnw Mass of atmospheric water 
liquid 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Assessment of risks involved in the design and 
operation of process plants has become exceedingly 
important due to the trend towards setting up more 
complex units with toxic, flammable or otherwise 
hazardous chemicals at extreme temperatures and 
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pressures. The potential risks of such plants get 
magnified with the larger units and also due to 
the proximity of location to densely populated 
areas, if any. Increasing public awareness of 
technological risks of such units, thus, has placed 
an onerous responsibility on the process industries 
to review their current safety practices and 
scientifically devise these to make the technologies, 
both intrinsically and extrinsically safer. Towards 
this goal, risk and hazard analysis has emerged 
as a modern tool, to define the potential occupational 
hazards to titanium sponge plant personnel and 
surrounding environment, and public and enable 
computing the associated risks based on the 
probability of likelihood and consequence levels. 
This study relates 'to the storage of large 
quantity of RCI, in tanks required for the production 
of titanium sponge in large, commercial- size 
batches. Titanium tetrachloride is a colourless, 
clear, fuming liquid with low viscosity and suffocating 
odourl. Some of its proper tie^^.^ are shown in 
Table 1. Titanium tetrachloride contains the Ti-X 
bond and has pronounced haloanhydride character, 
being highly reactive and aggre~s ive~ .~ .  On escape 
from the containment and exposure to moisture, 
it reacts readily, violently, and exothermically 
with water, releasing copious volume of HCL gas 
and producing titanium oxy chloride (TiOCl,) solid. 
Table 1. Physical data of titanium tetrachloride 
Parameter Value 
Colourlstate Colourless to pale yellow 
liquid at room temperature 
Cr~t~cal temperature ( 'C ) 358 
Freezing point ("C ) -25 
Boiling point ("C ) 135.80 
Molecular weight 189.73 
Specific gravity at 20°C (glml) 1.72 
Specific heat of liquid at 25 "C 
37.53 (cal I moll OC) 
Dielktric constant at 20 O C  2.79 
Conductivity Negligible 
A survey of accidents that occurred in USA 
between January 1990 and November 1999 revealed 
that there had been 473 incidents involving spillage 
of TiCl, alone, out of which 13 involved evacuation, 
injuries, or deaths8-". In an accident in 2001, the 
TiCl, evolved was as little as a few hundred milliliters, 
which was enough to generate a considerable volume 
of HCl affecting the employees at the titanium sponge 
plant and the staff of the neighbouring premises, 
as the resultant escaping gas drifted towards them',. 
Thus, this study aims at quantifying the hazards 
and consequences relating to the storage of TiCl, 
using the fault tree and consequence analysis 
techniques for estimating the risk to the environment 
and to identify the measures to be incorporated in 
the design and operation of TiC1, storage tanks. 
2. HAZARD IDENTIFICATION-TITANIUM 
TETRACHLORIDE STORAGE 
Fire explosion and toxicity index (FETI) analysis 
and hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies have 
been used to identify the hazardous sections of the 
titanium sponge plant. One of the major hazards 
identified from the HAZOP studies is the release 
of HCl due to the hydrolysis of TiCl, upon contact 
with moisture in the environment during the spillage1 
leakage caused by the rupture of TiCl, from the 
storage tanks. 
On the basis of FETI analysis, the storage section 
has been categorised as medium toxicity hazard 
and low fire and explosion hazard. The storage 
section comprises three, 25 T capacity, horizontally 
placed SS 304L tanks. Titanium tetrachloride is 
transferred to the adjacent sections and the standby 
tanks through pipelines. As the inventory of the 
TiCl, material in the storage section is large, it has 
been taken up for detailed qualitative and quantitative 
assessments. 
3. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE 
The fault tree analysis technique gives all possible 
minimum combinations of basic equipment, instrument, 
- - 
and operator's failures, called minimum cut sets, 
which could lead to the occurrence of the critical 
event, commonly known as the top event. The 
fault tree is solved to obtain the set of basic events 
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whose combination could lead to the occurrence 
of an unwanted top event. On the basis of FETI 
analysis and HAZOP studies, the fault tree for the 
critical event, ie, release of HCI gas has been 
constructed. 
3.1 Fault Tree Construction 
The complete fault tree is shown in 
Fig. l(a) to l(e). The failure rates of the events 
are based on the data from several sources" 14, 
suitably modified, whenever necessary, to account 
for the Indian conditions. 
3.2 Fault Tree Analysis 
The total number of minimal cut sets for this 
fault tree has been computed to be 414. The minimal 
cut sets in order of increasing the number of years 
or decreasing the number of occurrence of top 
event are listed in Table 2. 
Table 2. Fault tree analysis of top event occurrence 
Minimal cut sets Failure rate 
(106)(230)(231)(234)(229)(226) 1.55E-03 
Operator's error and electricity failures have 
been identified as the basic failures which result the operator-related failures are generally more 
in high frequency of top event occurrence. The common than the instrument-related failures, and 
failure rate of the top event has been calculated due to their unpredictability, the complexity of 
to be 1.55 E-03. Previous ~ t u d i e s l ~ . ' ~  reveal that the situation increases manifolds. On the basis 
RELEASE OF HCl PROM I STORAGETANK I 
RUPPURE OF STORAGE I T*_ I EMERGENCY RESPONSE I QOAM, etc, ARE NOT USED TO 
QUALrrV TRAINED PRESENT 
Figure l(a). Fault tree for the release of HCI from the storage tank 
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MOISTURE INGRESS 
VENT LINE CLOSED OPERATOR'S INACTION DUE TO LEAKAGE 
THROUGH OPENINGS 
22 1 222 
(0.130) (0010) 
Figure l(b). Fault tree for the release of HCI from the storage tank 
of the observations brought forward by fault tree Table 3. Sensitivity analysis 
analysis technique, recommendations regarding 
maintenanceloperator's training have been made. Top event occurrence 
3.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
Basic event Recommendation 
Before After 
Sensitivity analysis has been carried out to 
determine the effect of incorporating the suggested Design of .Provide rupture disks the tank -Modify the design as 1.558-03 8.01E-04 
modifications on the system safety. The results of jacketed tanks 
the analysis are shown in Table 3. It is apparent 
from this table that incorporation of the suggested Electricity Generator for auto failure takeoff 8.01B04 9.61E-06 
modifications in the design and operation can bring 
Operator's Operator's training for improvement of several orders of magnitude in the 
nonnal and remedial 9.61EA6 3.32607 
system safety. measures 
3.4 Consequence Analysis Emergency Preoperational checks transfer 
system 3.328-07 8.98E-08 Titanium tetrachloride is used and transported 
in its liquid phase, and therefore on spillage, it failure 
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EQUIPMENT DESIGN MATERIAL FAILURE 
~(2Jyk-l INADEQUATE 
I I EXTERNAL I 
INADEQUATE 
MAINTAINENCE INADEQUATE HOUSEKEEPING 
114 115 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Figure l(c). Fault tree for the release of KC1 from the storage tank 
I C 
IN ADJACENT 
113 223 
(0.01) (em) 235 
Figure l(d). Fault tree for the release of HCl from the storage tank 
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('-J(-'Ji+j TRANSFER PIPING 
TRANSFER SYSTEM 
FAILURE 
FAILS TO NOTICE 
REMEDIAL 
MALFUNCllONb'G ACTION 
228 229 
(0.010) (1.550) 
OPERATOR'S ERROR 
Figure l(e). Fault tree for the release of HCl from the storage tank 
I I 
creates liquid pool. Titanium tetrachloride reacts contains only TiCl, liquid, as there is not enough 
violently with water in the environment (ground, water to allow HCl to enter into the solution. 
substrate) releasing NCl gas and TiOCl, solid as 
shown below. 4. EFFECTS & DAMAGE CALCULATIONS 
Neutral dispersion model has been used to assess 
When chloride 
TiCl, + H,O TiOC12 + 2HCl the effects of HCZ dispersion into the surrounding 
in excess ' atmosphere. TNO effects model and TNO yellow 
(1)  book" have been used to carry out the consequence 
analysis. 
When water 
TiC1, + 2 H , 0 u T i 0 2  +4HCl ( 2 )  4.1 Pool Radius Calculntion 
In excess 
Generally for chemical storage tanks, release 
This highly exothermic reaction supplies the of half of the tank capacity is normally considered. 
pool with energy, thereby raising its temperature However, for the storage in close grouping of 
and vapour evolution rate. The pool formed usually three or more tanks, a large quantity is assumed 
ROY, rt. ol.: QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT IN TITANIUM SPONGE PLANT 
to be released, 90 per cent in the case of vertical 4.3 Dispersion Calculations 
tanks and 80 per cent in horizontal tanks. It is 
assumed that out of 2ST of TiCl, stored in the 
tank, 20T is released on rupture of the tank, 
forming a pool. Based on these, the radius of the 
pool has been calculated to be 22.6 m. 
4.2 Moisture Availablility 
In most cases, the reaction of TiCI, with 
moisture proceeds under excess of TiCl,, with 
HC1 dispersing into the atmosphere. During spreading, 
the pool encounters free ground water, substrate 
water, and also absorbs atmospheric moisture. 
After spreading has ceased, the water is absorbed 
only from the substrate and the atmospheric moisture. 
- 
Assuming a time period of 30 min for the reaction 
of ECI, released with the available water, the source 
strength of HC1 evolved was calculated to be 2.12 kgls 
(Appendix 1). Figure 2 depicts the directional IDLH 
(145 mglm3) contour during monsoon. Figures 3 
and 4 give the variation of concentration with the 
downwind distance up to TLV and IDLH limits. 
The population staying within a radial distance of 
1300 m needs to be evacuated within 30 min, while 
the population staying within a radial distance of 
8650 m needs to be alerted. The data for the model 
is based on the wind speed data provided, and the 
scenario has been estimated (Appendix 1) using a 
wind speed of 2 m/s and ambient temperature of 33 "C. 
THESOURCE 
Figure 2. Depiction of an IDLH (145 mglm') plume from the time of release to t = 1800 s in the wind direction during monsoon 
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lax, 2000 m 4axl SMO m 7m0 m 9000 lWOO 
Figure 3. Variation of concentration with distance (up to TLV limit) 
4.4 Effect of Seasonal Variation time) is  west-north-west, so  the probability of 
HCl dispersing in this direction is  the maximum. 
Based on the wind rose Pattern supplied by During winter, the wind direction is reversed with 
the local meteorological department, the predominant the pl;me pointing towards east-south-east (47 % 
wind direction during monsoon (17 % of the of the time). 
0 200 403 600 800 lax, I m ,  1403 
DISTANCE (m) 
Figure 4. Variation of concentration with distance (up to IDLH limit) 
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4.5 Incident Outcome Frequency Calculations 
The frequency of release of HCI due to  
storage tank rupture was found to be 1.55X 
per year. Based on this data and the directional 
wind probability, the incident outcome during 
monsoon and winter have been calculated. The 
results for monsoon and winter are summarised 
in Tables 4 and 5. This value i s  beyond the 
acceptable limits of 10-6events/year as given 
by TNO for catastrophic events (with large 
consequences in terms of fatalities). 
Table 4. Estimation of incident outcome during monsoon 
Incident Wind Directional Incident 
Event frequency direction probability outcome per year 
1.558-03 S 0.015 2.338-05 
1.55303 NNW 0.070 1.09E-04 
1.55303 WSW 0.080 I.24E-04 
Release Of HC1 1.55303 SSW 0.095 l.47E-04 
due to leakage 
of storage tank l.55E-03 W 0.110 1.71E-04 
1.55E-03 WNW 0.170 2.648-04 
Total 0.805 1.25E-03 
Table 5. Estimation of incident outcome during winter 
Incident Wind Directional lncident 
Event frequency direction probability outcome 
per Ye== 
1.55E-03 SSE 0.015 2.33305 
1.558-03 N 0.020 3.1OE-05 
Release of HCI 1.55~-03 WSW 0.020 3.10E-05 
due to leakage 
of storage tank 3.558-03 SSW 0.030 4.658-05 
Total 0.805 3.25303 
Tables 6 and 7 indicate the incident outcome 
after implementation of the recommendations. 
As is apparent, the incident outcome has been 
considerably reduced (7.23E-08). which is well 
within the acceptable limits. 
Table 6. Estimation of incident outcome after implementation 
of the recommendations during monsoon 
Incident Wind Directional Incident Event frequency d. ~rection probability outcome 
per year 
8.98608 S 0.015 1.35E-09 
8.98308 NNW 0.070 6.298-09 
8.98E-08 WSW 0.080 7.18E-09 
of HC1 8.98308 SSW 0.095 8.538-09 due to leakage 
of storage tank g,g8~.08 w 0.110 9.88E-09 
8.98E-08 SW 0.120 1.08E-08 
8.98E-08 NW 0.145 1.30E-08 
8.988-08 WNW 0.170 1 .53E-08 
Total 0.805 7.23E-08 
Table 7. Estimation of incident outcome after implementation 
of the recommendations during winter 
Incident Wind Directional Incident 
Event direction probability outcome per year 
Release of HCI 8 . 9 8 ~ 8  
due to leakage 
of storage tank 8.98E-08 
8.98E-08 
Total 
SSE 
N 
NNE 
WSW 
SSW 
5 
NE 
SE 
4.6 Damage Calculations 
The effect calculations give the extent of the 
IDLH and TLV plumes, while the probability 
calculations give the directional probability of 
the incident outcome. Their damage potential is 
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calculated based on the extent of IDLH plume 
and its superimposition on the layout of the titanium 
sponge plant and the surrounding areas. Tables 
4 and 5 give the area of exposure and population 
at risk during monsoon and winter. If effective 
measures are instituted to evacuate within 30 min 
the affected population residing within 1.3 km 
radius, the damage to the personnel present within 
the titanium sponge plant who might be affected, 
immediately comes down. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The release of HCI due to the rupture of TiCZ, 
storage tank has been quantitatively assessed. On 
the basis of the probability calculations using fault 
tree analysis technique as well as the effect and 
damage calculations &ing consequence analysis, 
an assessment of the individual risk has been carried 
out as follows: 
The effect of the seasonal variation on the 
risk values was considered as environmental 
conditions, namely humidity, wind direction, and 
wind velocity, which have a substantial bearing 
on the quantity of HCI released and its dispersion 
into the environment. Individual risk values for 
both the monsoon and winter, have been estimated 
and the results are summarised in the Tables 8 
and 9. The total individual risk, as seen from 
these tables, is 2.37 fatalitieslyear during monsoon 
and 0.67 fatalitieslyear during winter. Incorporation 
of the suggested preventive measures brings down 
the probability of occurrence of the top event, 
ie, spillage of TiC1,and the subsequent release 
of HCI. This reduces the risk to 4.79E-05 fatalities1 
year and 3.87E-05 fatalitieslyear for both monsoon 
and winter seasons (Tables 10 and 11). After 
implementation of the protective measures, ie, 
evacuation of the people, and assuming only 5 
personnel to be present at the site, the risk comes 
down to 3.6 E-07 fatalitieslyear. 
On comparison with the risk assessment matrix 
given in the Table 12, the frequency of 1.25E-03 
eventslyear for monsoon (before implementation 
Table 8. Estimation of individual risk during monsoon 
Contributing Frequency Wind Area of Population Risk and 
incident of incidence direction exposure fatalities 
per year tsq m) per year* 
2.33E-05 S 46200 200 4.66803 
1.09E-04 NNW 46200 500 5.45B02 
1.24E-04 WSW 46200 600 7.44802 
1.478-04 SSW 46200 600 8.82802 
HCI due to 
1.71E+O leakageof 1.71E-03 W 46200 IOOO storage tank 
1.868-04 SW 46200 6M) 1.12801 
2.258-04 NW 46200 500 1.13E-01 
2.678-04 WNW 46200 800 2.14801 
Total 2 37 
Total individual risk h m  TiCI, storage tank rupture is 2.37. Assuming 
population not evacuated within 30 min. 
Table 9. Estimation of individual risk during winter 
Conhibuting lkquency Wind Amof  PopllaIion Risk and 
incident of incidence direction exposure fatalities 
peryear (sq m) per year* 
2.33E45 SSE 46200 6Ml 1.40E-02 
3.10E05 NNE 46200 500 1.55E-02 
Release of 
3.10E0.5 WSW 46200 600 1.86M2 
'*Of 4.65E05 SSW 46200 6W 2 7 9 W  s t o w  tank 
1.32IM4 S 462LXl 200 2 . M m  
Taal 6.68Eo1 
Tatal individual risk from ECl, storage tank rupture is 0.668 . 
* Assuming population not evacuated within 30 min. 
of the recommendations), falls under the probable 
category, while the damage comes under the 
catastrophic category. Thus, the risk comes under 
the A category, ie, unacceptable. After implementation 
of the recommendations, the frequency of occurrence 
comes down to 7.23 E-08 eventslyear, which 
falls under the improbable category, while the 
damage comes under the marginal category. Thus, 
the risk comes under the C category, ie, acceptable 
with review. 
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Table 10. Estimation of individual risk after implementation 
of the recommendations during monsoon 
Contributing Frequency Wind Area of Population Risk and 
incident of incidence direction exposure fatalities 
per year (sq m) per year 
1.35E-09 S 46200 200 2.698-07 
6.298-09 NNW 46200 500 3.L4E-06 
7.18E-09 WSW 46200 600 4.318-06 
Release of 
~ ~ ~ , j ~ ~ t ~  8.53E-09 SSW 46200 600 5.12E-06 
leakage of 
storage tank 9.888-09 W 46200 loo0 9.8%-06 
l.08E-08 SW 46200 600 6.47E-06 
1.30E-08 NW 46200 500 6.51&06 
1.53E-08 WNW 46200 800 I.2ZE-05 
Total 4.79505 
1 
Table 11. Estimation of individual risk after implementation 
of the recommendations during winter 
Contributing Frequency Wind Area of Population Risk and 
incident of incidence direction exposure fatalities 
per year (sq m) per year 
Releare of 
HCl due IO 
leakage of 
storage tank 
1.35E-09 
1 .8OE-09 
I.80E-09 
1.8OE-09 
2.69B09 
7.63E-09 
1.26E-08 
4.27508 
Total 
SSE 46200 
N 46200 
NNE 46200 
WSW 46200 
SSW 46200 
S 46200 
NE 46200 
SE 46200 
Table 12. Risk assessment matrix 
Frequency of Hazard category 
occurrence 
Catastrophic Critical Marginal Negligible 
(>loo) 0 -  - 0  (<I) 
Frequent (0.01) A A A C 
Probable (0.001) A A B C 
Occasional (0.0001) A B B D 
Remote (E-5) B B C D 
Immbable (56)  C C C D 
A - Unacceptable, B - Undesirable (management decision), 
C - Acceptable with review, 0 - Acceptable without review 
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APPENDIX 1 
Pool Radius Calculation 
Amount of TiCl, spilled = 20,000 kg 
Density of TiC1, = 1.728 kg11 
Hence, volume of TiC1, spilled = 11574.07x10"m-3 
Area of the storage section = 1600 mZ 
Height of spilled liquid = 0.7 cm 
Radius of pool formed =g= 22.6 m 
Moisture Calculation 
Assuming the following: 
z =  10 m 
Considering relative humidity of 70 per cent (worst case scenario during monsoon) 
Maw = 0.027 kg 
1," = 0.002 m (assumed) 
C = Cement content in concrete = 400 kglm3 
Mcgm, = 213.9 kg 
M,w = ( ( 1 / 3 ~ r ~ ( ~ , - l , ~ . ,  )lWcem1+ 0.2 M 
Mrem = 180 kg/m3 (assumed average value) 
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Assuming free-water film thickness on the ground as 0.0005 m 
Mass of water = 802.3 kg 
Total water available for the reaction: 
Total mass of water encountered in each time step (assumed time step of 10 s) from concrete 
= 139.06 kg 
Mass of atmospheric water = 0.027 kg 
Mass of water on the ground = 802.3 kg 
Total water = 52.3 kg moles 
Stochiometric Calculation 
TiCl, + H 2 0  + TiOC1, + 2HCI 
TiC1, spilled = 105.26 kg moles 
Since water is the limiting reactant, amount of HCl formed = 3818 kg. 
